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Background: Tracing persons who have been in
contact with an infectious patient may be very effective
in preventing the spread of communicable diseases.
However, criteria to decide when to conduct contact
tracing are not well established. We have investigated
the available evidence for contact tracing with a focus
on public ground transport aiming to give guidance in
what situations contact tracing should be considered.
Methods: Relevant infectious diseases suitable for
contact tracing in ground transport and a set of
disease-specific epidemiological criteria were defined
through literature search and structured multistep
expert consultations. We developed continuous scales
for each criterion to be rated for its relevance to
contact tracing in ground transport. We used the
Delphi method with an international expert panel to
position the values of criteria on the respective scales.
Results: The study led to the development of the
‘Contact Tracing-Risk Assessment Profile’ (CT-RAP),
a decision-making instrument, taking into account
pathogen-specific as well as situation-specific criteria.
This report describes the methodology of this
instrument and presents two examples of ready-to-use
CT-RAP for tuberculosis and for meningococcal
disease in public ground transport.
Discussion: The systematic and transparent use of
the CT-RAP for tuberculosis and meningococcal
disease is likely to facilitate reasonable, efficient and
user-friendly decisions with respect to contact tracing.
New CT-RAPs for additional pathogens and different
settings such as schools and kindergartens are being
planned.
BACKGROUND
Contact tracing is defined as the identifica-
tion of persons who may have been exposed
to an infectious pathogen by an infected
person and ensuring that they are aware of
their exposure.1 2 Contact tracing is an estab-
lished procedure to control infectious
disease transmission and it is gaining import-
ance in International Health Regulations.3
The decision to initiate contact tracing
usually needs to be made at short notice to
be effective and typically within a context of
provisional and limited information. This
results in a need for decision aids that would
provide standardisation and, at the same
time, allow flexibility in the decision-making
process, given the diverse circumstances in
which the risk of infectious disease spread
has to be assessed.
In the framework of the EU-funded project
‘Response to Emerging infectious disease:
Assessment and development of Core capaci-
ties and Tools’ (REACT), we have investi-
gated the available evidence and tools on
contact tracing aiming to guide public health
institutions in their decision-making.
Travelling in public transport, often in con-
fined spaces, provides risks for exposure to
infectious pathogens. It seems likely that the
ARTICLE SUMMARY
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ The presented approach may help to address the
challenges of having to rapidly decide on import-
ant public health interventions even if the avail-
able evidence is limited.
▪ Validation of the tool would be difficult to con-
ceptualise in an experimental or controlled
manner.
▪ The new risk assessment tool allows rapid, event
specific decision making and may also be adapt-
able for other public health decision making
challenges beyond contact tracing.
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risk of airborne infectious disease transmission in public
ground transport such as buses/coaches, railways and
trams/metro is higher than in air transport.4 While
guidelines on contact tracing after exposure to airborne
infectious pathogens during air travel exist,5 6 no guid-
ance documents are available on contact tracing in
response to potential exposure on public ground trans-
port, even though European transport statistics show that
the share of total transport performance in 2007 in
public ground transport was nearly twice as high (15.7%)
as the share for air transport performance (8.8%).7 8
By studying the literature on these issues, we found
two dominating formats for recommendations on
contact tracing: the first is a descriptive text or a list of
variable length and precision.10–13 The other frequently
used format is a flow chart which presents certain condi-
tions in successive order, thus resulting in each condi-
tion contributing an equal weight to the final
decision.5 11 13–15 Both formats have their shortcomings
when the available evidence and the multitude of set-
tings cannot readily be subsumed under dichotomised
decision tree algorithms.
In order to address the aforementioned challenges,
we developed a risk assessment tool informed by a
review of the scientific literature on the one hand and
the practical experience of experts on the other. The
aim was to not only present the guidance as explicitly as
possible but also to give a transparent account of the
uncertainties resulting from the limited evidence or
data. This article reports on the methodological basis of
this risk assessment tool. We present the results in exem-
plary risk assessment profiles for deciding whether or
not contact tracing may be indicated after passengers
have been exposed to Mycobacterium tuberculosis or
Neisseria meningitidis in public ground transport.
METHODS
Literature search
We extracted publications on tuberculosis and meningo-
coccal disease from an extended literature review on the
evidence for airborne infectious disease transmission in
public ground transport.4 Further, we screened guide-
lines, position papers and peer-reviewed literature for
disease-specific parameters, such as infectiousness of
index case during exposure, symptom(s) of index case
during exposure period, duration of exposure of contact
person to index case, proximity and quality of contact
between index case and fellow passengers, susceptibility
of fellow passengers, possibility of postexposure prophy-
laxis, and information on environmental factors poten-
tially influencing the transmission of infectious diseases
(CR-RAP Final Product).16
Structured expert consultations
To provide scientific and technical input, four core
experts from a pool of 30 international collaborating
project partners (such as the European National Public
Health Institutes, the WHO and the European Centre
for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)) were nomi-
nated at the first General Meeting of the REACT
project. Those four core experts provide the project with
expertise from diverse settings. As required by the
donor, they represent different EU countries and
various stakeholders. The core experts cover a wide
range of perspectives: one infectious disease epidemiolo-
gist working for an international public health agency,
one infectious disease epidemiologist working for a
national public health institute, one infectious disease
epidemiologist working for a local public health institute
and one expert in security/health issues working for an
international public transport association. Those core
experts participated in two structured round table con-
sultations. We further consulted infectious disease epide-
miologists from the Robert Koch-Institute (RKI) with
disease-specific expertise. In addition, 18 international
infectious disease epidemiologists from the pool of col-
laborating partners affiliated with the REACT project, as
well as nominated at the 1st General Meeting, contribu-
ted their expertise to a Delphi consultation process in
two rounds.
Step 1: Selection of infectious diseases
At the first round table consultation, we turned to the
four core experts to gather information enabling us to
select infectious diseases that require contact tracing in
public ground transport and to reach a consensus on
the general epidemiological and environmental criteria
that might influence the transmission of infectious dis-
eases and the subsequent decision-making process.
Step 2: Selection of criteria and associated values
Where necessary, the general criteria identified in step
one were transformed into disease-specific criteria.
Subsequently, we defined between two and four values
with respect to the epidemiological criterion, for
example, for the tuberculosis-specific epidemiological
criterion ‘transmission to other contact persons’, we
defined the two values ‘evidence of transmission’ and
‘no evidence of transmission’. The definition of those
epidemiological criteria-related values was deducted
from the scientific literature with input from RKI infec-
tious disease experts.
Step 3: Positioning of values on Osgood’s scale
On the basis of the principle of Osgood’s bipolar seman-
tic differential scale,17 18 we developed for each of the
selected epidemiological criteria of tuberculosis and
meningococcal disease continuous 20 cm scales19 with a
predefined midpoint. The positioning of an epidemio-
logical criterion-related value towards the very right end
of the scale was to indicate a stronger argument in
favour of contact tracing, while positioning towards the
left end was to indicate that contact tracing was not
recommended. We provided 18 international experts in
the field of infectious disease epidemiology with the
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respective literature and complementary evidence on
the criteria and invited them to graphically mark the
position and range (start and end points) of the respect-
ive values on a blank scale representing his/her best
view on the indication to initiate contact tracing for each
epidemiological criterion.
We applied the Delphi method with the international
expert panel as developed by the RAND Corporation to
refine the position of values on bipolar scales. The
Delphi Method is a structured survey in multiple rounds
or votes in order to reach consensus among a panel of
experts and enables a heterogeneous group to express
their collective experience and know-how. The anonym-
ous opinions of all members of the group are collected
using a formal questionnaire or graph. However, discus-
sion is only permitted after the last round of voting,
because opinion leaders might otherwise sway their col-
leagues’ assessments.20–22
After the first round, the individual markings of the
expert group on the scales for each value were collected
and compiled. The results of the first round were shared
in a plenary session by showing the median of the start
Figure 1 Contact tracing-risk assessment profile tuberculosis.
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and end points for each value on the bipolar scales. The
application of the Delphi method requires that each
round is followed by controlled group feedback.
Contributions remained anonymous at all times. In a
second individual and final round, the international
experts were given the opportunity to rearrange the
primary voting on the placement and range of values.
Again, the results were presented to the expert panel.
Step 4: Adjustments, refinements and background
documents
On the basis of the results from the Delphi process, we
merged two values if their positions on the scales were
largely overlapping and thus not leading to any
discriminative power. We displayed the range of the
values (median of the start and end points) through
whiskers to demonstrate the variation of opinions held
by the international expert panel (figures 1 and 2). The
final position of the points between the whiskers was
defined by the mean of the median of the start and end
points of each value. Epidemiological criteria were
moved to the beginning of the epidemiological criteria
scales if the particular epidemiological criterion turned
out to result in a dichotomous ‘all or nothing’ decision.
For each disease-specific risk assessment tool, we com-
piled a narrative summary of the scientific literature,
guidelines, position papers, disease-specific epidemio-
logical attributes and expert experience which had built
Figure 2 Contact tracing-risk assessment profile meningococcal disease.
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Figure 3 Contact tracing-risk assessment profile: tuberculosis (applied). Instructions to the user: Both the contact tracing-risk
assessment profile (CT-RAP) on tuberculosis and the CT-RAP on meningococcal disease start with a dichotomous decision step. If
necessary, the user may proceed with the bipolar scale component: the two endpoints of the bipolar scales represent a high (on the
right-hand side) or a low (on the left-hand side) indication of whether or not to start contact tracing. The values selected and ticked
may cluster on either side of the neutral midline or around the midline according to the particular details of the situation. By drawing a
line connecting selected values, an overall assessment is visualised (see figures 3 and 4). If most values in the CT-RAP cluster on the
right end of the scale, the result can be interpreted as an indication to start the contact tracing process. In contrast, profiles with values
marked predominantly on the left end of the scale show a low indication for contact tracing. If the CT-RAP values are predominantly
positioned around the midline, a recommendation neither for nor against contact tracing may be deduced. The neutral position should
also be chosen because lack of information does not allow the allocation of a value.
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the basis for this tool, as well as a one-page fact sheet
describing the clinical and epidemiological characteris-
tics of the disease.
RESULTS
Selected infectious diseases
The international expert group identified tuberculosis
and meningococcal disease as the two infectious diseases
with the highest priority for the development of a
disease-specific risk assessment tool. Tuberculosis was
selected because of the stigmatisation and the long dur-
ation of treatment, whereas meningococcal disease was
identified because of the potentially severe complica-
tions and the high-case death rate. Measles and viral
haemorrhagic fever (Lassa fever) were also identified as
possible future candidates for the development of a risk
assessment tool.
Selected criteria
The core expert group identified 17 generic epidemio-
logical criteria to be considered for the development of
such a contact tracing risk assessment tool. Six of the cri-
teria (‘therapy or targeted measures available’, ‘airborne
transmission’, ‘communicability during symptoms’, ‘high
grade immune deficiency or immunosuppression of
contact person’, ‘travel duration >8 h’, ‘distance to index
case <1 meter’) were identified to be relevant and
applicable for both tuberculosis and meningococcal
disease; two epidemiological criteria applied only to
meningococcal disease (‘prophylaxis available’, ‘commu-
nicability before onset of symptoms’) and ‘drug resist-
ance pattern’ was added for tuberculosis as a result of
the expert consultation in step 2. The following epi-
demiological criteria were identified to be not relevant
for tuberculosis or meningococcal disease: ‘high infec-
tiousness’, ‘high morbidity rate’, ‘severe complications’,
‘vaccination status of contact person’, ‘high humidity’,
‘pregnancy of contact person’, ‘contact person
>60 years’, ‘contact person <1 year’, ‘high seriousness as
perceived by public’.
Description of the contact tracing-risk assessment profile
On the basis of Osgood’s bipolar scale, we developed a
contact tracing-risk assessment profile (CT-RAP) for
tuberculosis and meningococcal disease to visualise epi-
demiological criteria and values in order to facilitate the
decision of whether or not to initiate contact tracing in
public ground transport.
The CT-RAP for tuberculosis starts with a dichotomous
decision step in the presence of infectious pulmonary
tuberculosis. Only if the index case is known to have
infectious pulmonary tuberculosis can the user proceed
with the bipolar scale component, which consists of nine
epidemiological criteria. For each epidemiological criter-
ion, a single, mutually exclusive value has to be selected.
All values are prepositioned on bipolar scales (figure 1).
The background information for the CT-RAP for
tuberculosis consists of a summary of relevant scientific
literature of 58 peer-reviewed publications in inter-
national journals and 20 guidance documents including
recommendations and position papers (see online sup-
plementary Annex 1 ‘Tuberculosis’).
For meningococcal disease, the dichotomous decision
step preceding the bipolar scale component of the
CT-RAP addresses the time span elapsed since exposure.
Only if this time span is equal to or less than 10 days can
the user continue with the bipolar scale component dis-
playing seven epidemiological criteria with each having
two to four different values (figure 2). The background
information of the CT-RAP for meningococcal disease
consists of a summary of the scientific literature of 17
peer-reviewed publications in international journals and
17 guidance documents (including recommendations
and position papers; see online supplementary Annex 2
‘Meningococcal disease’). Both CT-RAPs include a fact




Our report describes the methodological concept of a
decision-making tool and presents CT-RAP examples on
tuberculosis and on meningococcal disease. This new
approach aims to semiquantitatively translate evidence
of variable strength and on diverse conditions into a
graphical risk assessment tool. We intentionally derived
our approach from an assessment tool that is well estab-
lished in the social sciences to display different charac-
teristics, which in its sum will give a pictorial and
semiquantitative impression through an overall profile.
Although our application is based on biological and epi-
demiological criteria, the challenge is similar to that
used in social sciences since the outcome of one meas-
urement alone will not force, like in many dichotomous
structures, a decision but will allows it to weigh in other
factors. It is rather a combination of conditions which
characterise a specific situation that may lead the deci-
sion towards a certain direction. A numerical computa-
tion of individual scores could also cope with the
combination of different criteria, but it tends to suggest
a precision not supported by the available evidence.
Thus, the visual impression resulting from the connect-
ing lines between the ticked values of the epidemio-
logical criteria is likely to give enough of a tendency to
quickly support decision-making while leaving enough
room for the decision-makers to take other important
issues into account. In addition, the disease-specific epi-
demiological criteria of the CT-RAP can, in combination
with the fact sheet, be employed as a checklist of decisive
parameters.
The concept is novel insofar as it addresses the need
for rapid and transparent decision-making in situations
and settings where scientific evidence is scarce. An
attempt to give a semiquantitative account of the degree
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Figure 4 Contact tracing-risk assessment profile: meningococcal disease (applied). Instructions to the user: Both the contact
tracing-risk assessment profile (CT-RAP) on tuberculosis and the CT-RAP on meningococcal disease start with a dichotomous
decision step. If necessary, the user may proceed with the bipolar scale component: the two endpoints of the bipolar scales
represent a high (on the right-hand side) or a low (on the left-hand side) indication of whether or not to start contact tracing.
The values selected and ticked may cluster on either side of the neutral midline or around the midline according to the particular
details of the situation. By drawing a line connecting selected values, an overall assessment is visualised (see figures 3 and 4).
If most values in the CT-RAP cluster on the right end of the scale, the result can be interpreted as an indication to start the
contact tracing process. In contrast, profiles with values marked predominantly on the left end of the scale show a low indication
for contact tracing. If the CT-RAP values are predominantly positioned around the midline, a recommendation neither for nor
against contact tracing may be deduced. The neutral position should also be chosen because lack of information does not allow
the allocation of a value.
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of uncertainty, for example, by plotting CIs and means
for each point estimate representing the experts’ opi-
nions, is of course the subject for discussion. Indicating
the medians as well as the minimum and maximum
point estimates would be an alternative approach. Both
approaches have their advantages. Even the objective to
give a semiquantitative account of the degree of uncer-
tainty might be questioned. But we preferred to show
the degree of uncertainty inherent in each decisive cri-
terion by displaying the range of values through whiskers
(median of the highest and lowest rankings of aggre-
gated experts’ opinions). Considering that some criteria
have a lesser degree of uncertainty than others and that
some users might not consider the degree of uncertainty
at all, we believe our approach is more suitable.
It could be argued that criteria should be removed
from the decision-making tool if the point estimates of
the different outcomes cluster closely around the
neutral midline and thus do not sway a decision either
way; however, all criteria were included in the first
instance because they have been raised in various publi-
cations or during expert consultations. We decided to
keep them in spite of the fact that they might carry little
discriminatory power because users might question how
these criteria compare with others. Moreover, they dem-
onstrate that our process of collecting available evidence
and assessing it systematically by experts did indeed gen-
erate somewhat unexpected yet plausible results.
The graphical display of the criteria allows selected cri-
teria to be presented next to each other without suggest-
ing specific weights or assigning priorities to each
criterion. For example, antimicrobial resistance may be a
more important issue to take into account in some coun-
tries than others. The nomination procedure for the
expert panel was based on the rather strong objective
and guiding principle of representing different EU
countries and various stakeholders, a prerequisite for
successful funding within the EU public health
programme.
Case example and legend for figures 3 and 4
A 24 year-old female exchange student from Brussels,
Belgium, travels to Berlin, Germany by coach. Nine days
later, she is being diagnosed with disease X. Her medical
record is uneventful; she reports excellent health in the
previous three years. She describes symptom onset of
cough just before boarding the bus. During the 9.5 hour
trip, she had kept to herself listening to music in the
back of the bus. The coach company does not keep pas-
senger lists on this route but estimates that there were a
total of 12 persons aboard. They confirm that air condi-
tioning with partial air exchange is in use on all vehicles
and therefore windows remain closed at all times. No
further information is available.
If in this scenario the disease is infectious pulmonary
tuberculosis (Figure 3) the completed CT-RAP indicates
that a contact investigation could be given further consid-
eration. Taking identical circumstances, i.ethe same
setting etc., but replacing infectious pulmonary tubercu-
losis with meningococcal disease, the connecting line on
the disease specific CT-RAP signals that contact tracing
might be much less called for (Figure 4).
Contact tracing after potential transmission of infec-
tious diseases in public ground transport is often ham-
pered by logistic hurdles; tracing passengers may be
limited or even unfeasible since passenger data (eg,
name, telephone number, email address) in metros,
trams and short-distance bus trips are not collected. If
passenger data are indeed collected, incompleteness of
data, transport company policies and limited or delayed
(retrospective) access to data may be further obstacles.
Even in long-distance railway or bus transportation, pas-
senger data may also not be collected routinely.4 23
Taking into account the logistic bottlenecks and the
high financial resources contact tracing may require, we
suppose that only circumstances related to dramatic
illness and identifiable travel groups would justify
contact investigations in the setting of public ground
transport.
We complemented the available scientific evidence
generated through the literature review by structured
multistep expert consultations. While individual experts
might not appreciate all epidemiological criteria equally
well or weigh their effects differently, all criteria selec-
tions with their respective values on our CT-RAPs are
the result of a Delphi consultation process. We are aware
that information such as ‘susceptibility of contact
persons’, ‘quality of contact between index case and
contact person’ or other information may not be avail-
able in each setting. Nevertheless, the CT-RAP may be
used under such circumstances: if there is no informa-
tion available on a criterion, the neutral midline pos-
ition on the scale of the respective epidemiological
criterion has to be chosen and the indication remains
unaffected.
The two CT-RAP examples on tuberculosis and menin-
gococcal disease shown in figures 3 and 4 illustrate how
this new tool offers a highly standardised decision algo-
rithm where evidence allows, but also remains open for
consideration of other factors. For example, a public
health official might consider a contact investigation in
the tuberculosis scenario dependent on the
drug-resistance pattern of the index case. Likewise, in
the meningococcal disease scenario, a contact tracing
might only yield results on the following day at the earli-
est. This would be right at the time limit of 10 days post-
exposure as indicated in the preceding algorithm and
favour a decision against contact tracing.
The systematic and transparent use of the evidence in
the presented CT-RAP for tuberculosis and meningococ-
cal disease is likely to facilitate rational and user-friendly
decisions with respect to contact tracing. The creation of
more CT-RAPs for other pathogens and settings is envi-
saged. However, since the development of a CT-RAP is
labour intensive, we initiated an evaluation of the existing
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tools to support the decision of whether or not to
produce more rapid risk assessment profiles and, if so,
for which settings (eg, schools, kindergartens) and for
which infectious diseases (eg, measles, Lassa fever). In
2011, we have presented this tool in an international
workshop in Berlin with participants from various public
health institutions, including representatives from the
WHO, the European Commission, the Early Warning
Response System and the ECDC. The risk assessment
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